

Project
European Universities: Lectures which Tell the World about Ukraine

Ukrainian Crisis 2013 – 2014: Geopolitical and Security Dimensions

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1. Chronology and important milestones / triggers

- **Suspension of AA signature and Maidan:**

- 21. November – suspension of AA by prime-minister Azarov and first protest meetings on November, 22
- 29. November – police violence against students and large rally on December, 1 (start of Maidan) with first violence near Presidential office
- 11. December – attempt to “clean Maidan” and clashes
- 17. December - Yanukovych-Putin 15 \$bn. agreements

Repressions against opposition and protesters, kidnapping practices, “titushki” phenomenon

- 16. January – package of laws adopted in Rada and sharp reaction of protesters (first serious large-scale fights with police)
- 28-29. January Azarov resigned and anti-protest laws annulled
- 18-20 February – mini-war in centre of Kyiv with hundreds of killed and wounded
- 21. February – agreements with Yanukovych and his escape

Crimea

- 27-28. February - Russian special forces seized governmental offices
- 1. March – decision of RF Duma for Putin
- 16. March so-called referendum
- 18. March – Putin signed a bill on Crimea and Sevastopol

Chronology and important milestones / triggers (2)

- **Donbass**

April – first wave of capturing official building at South-East (attempts at other regions failed)

15.April – acting President Turchynov announced ATO

2.May – tragic events in Odessa

11.May – so called referenda in part of Donetsk and Lugansk regions

26-27.May – Ukrainian military forces regained control over Donetsk airport

20.June – cease-fire declared for 10 days period

5.July – separatists left Sloviansk

17.July - Malaysia airlines flight shot down near Grabove

Mid-July – start of intensive military operations against separatists with quick troops movement

22.August – first “humanitarian convoy” from Russia

24.August – large-scale invasion of regular RF troops to Ukraine (tragedy near Ilovaysk and Starobeshevo, threat to Mariupil)

Current fighting along line (Donetsk airport case)

Prospects for the winter

Latest worrisome developments

Chronology and important milestones / triggers (3)

- 17.April - Geneva agreements (MFA)
- 25.May - Presidential elections
- 6.June – first meeting of Presidents in Normandy
- 27.June – AA signed in Brussels (parts of it signed by Yatsenyuk on March,21)
- 2.July - Berlin agreements (MFA) and start of DCFTA talks
- 5.September and 19.September - Minsk agreements and Memo
- 12.September – 2nd round of DCFTA-talks among 3 parties
- 26.October - pre-term parliamentary elections
- 30.October - Brussels agreements on gas
- 2.November – “elections” in DPR and LPR

Association agreement

- Eurointegration and membership issue (aim vs. instrument) – latest EU-Ukraine statement on AA (31.10.2014)
- Copenhagen criteria (3+1)
- Start of negotiations (5.03.2007), Chalyi-Levitte formula in Evian (9.09.2008), main problems during negotiations, initializing AA (30.03.2012) and DCFTA (19.07.2012)
- “Game” of 2013 – increasing stakes and “Endspiel” in Vilnius
- Signing AA in 2014: on March,21 and June,27
- DCFTA story to be continued (consultations in July and September)
- 257/906 pages (ENG) document: 7 sections (486 articles), 4 annexes and 3 protocols

Main dimensions and possible implications

- **AA analysis:** dates, facts, figures and explanations
- Why Ukraine is of such crucial importance for RF?
- **Ukraine as a victim** in a time of global reshaping (in 90es succeeded to avoid this role)
- **Historic parallels:** Vienna Congress and Great concert in 19th century, Germany and Korea split in 20th century
- **Russia-Ukraine relations dynamics:** from non-recognition to seeking the ways to “push through” the own approach
- **European security evolution** since WWII and especially after 1991
- Threat of exploding current **“frozen conflicts” in Europe**
- **Nuclear disarmament** and non-proliferation
- Testing **new war practices, armaments and technologies** (Afghanistan, Libya, Ukraine, ISIL)
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3 layers (dimensions) of “Ukraine”-crisis

- Global level: Russia against West, initiating quasi global anti-western model revolt; end of post WWII / Cold War era and start of turbulence period (getting a new “global ranking” at the end)
- RF-Ukraine bilateral level: previous accidents and their resolution (fall of the USSR, problems with Crimea/gas before and Yeltsin decisions, Putin relations with Kuchma – Yuschenko – Yanukovych); problems and triggers in mutual relations and perceptions; short-term prospects
- Domestic level: results of previous 23 years; unsolved structural problems (emphasis on mismanagement of the country) and need of internal reconciliation processes; social transformation processes 1991-1999-2004-2014

3. Key global stakeholders and their positions (USA)

- No direct involvement, although indirectly quite active
- to punish RF is too principal **otherwise domino effect;**
- Ambivalent standpoint to Europe and Russia;
- Previous pivot to Asia and sharp stop now (**Chinese factor in equation**);
- Links to Middle East factor

3. Key global stakeholders and their positions (Russia)

- Direct and active involvement;
- post-soviet legacy and “revanchists” in power;
- ambitions to be a separate civilization between Europe and Asia
- RF accusations to West: no adequate response to RF cooperative proposals, Yugoslavia/Kosovo precedents;
- near neighbourhood-**Slavic unity-Russkiy Mir** ideas;
- gradual and consistent loose of positions in/around Ukraine);
- **real aims** – everything except Crimea to be negotiated;

3. Key global stakeholders and their positions (EU)

- Directly affected, involved to a certain degree;
- Sanctions as a main response to Russia;
- EU triumph in 90-s and decline since 2000s;
- **Problems with strategic vision** and implementation ability;
- **failure of ENP concept**;
- mistake with applying CEE matrix to Ukraine;
- **lack of real expertise** on Russia and Eastern Europe;

3. Key global stakeholders and their positions (China)

- **total winner as far;**
- Very cautious statements on “Ukraine” crisis since the beginning;
- **RF to be minor partner** between China and US;
- Chinas views on Great Europe;
- Chinas view on post-soviet space and role of Russia-Ukraine in its **Silk Road strategy**

Possible future scenarios

- **Cold War** – limited confrontation with possible option of Russia’s “defeat” (minimum result - change of Putin regime)
- **Cold Peace** - drawing and adhering the lines of influence, repeating the competition of systems
- **“Neither war, nor peace”** and further unpredictable escalation with “black swans” (the most dangerous option due to unpredictability and conflict potential)