Foreign Policy

BREXIT: the Challenges facing both Britain and the European Union

19.09.2017
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ICPS Press

The British PM Theresa May is expected to deliver a speech in Florence on September 19, in which she is going to outline the possible future of the relations between London and Brussels. What are the challenges faced by the UK and the EU after Brexit? What impact will Brexit have on the Ukrainian-British relations? For our English-speaking fellows, the ICPS prepared a research giving the answers to the abovementioned questions http://icps.com.ua/assets/uploads/images/images/eu/t_brexit.pdf.

Publications with tag «Foreign Policy»
Foreign Policy

Expert Dialogue: Ukrainian-Hungarian Relations. Webinar 1

The International Centre for Policy Studies, with the support of the International Visegrad Fund launches the project “Ukraine and V4 countries: promoting better understanding”. ICPS experts together with partner organizations such as the Institute of International Relations and Trade (Hungary), the Institute for Economic and Social Reforms (Slovakia) and the Bronislaw Gemerek Foundation (Poland) discussed the issues of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations within the framework of the first webinar. Since 2017, relations between the two countries are in constant aggravation. The trigger for the conflict with Hungary was the adoption of the Law of Ukraine on Education which linguistic article caused a sharp critique of the Hungarian government and subsequently led to the blockade by the official Budapest of a number of initiatives in the Ukraine-NATO relations. Recently, the situation has escalated after the scandal with “Hungarian passports” for residents of Transcarpathia and mutual diplomatic threats between the official Kyiv and Budapest. During the ICPS-initiated online webinar, the experts discussed the causes of misunderstandings between Ukraine and Hungary, the existing differences in the policy of good neighborliness, and also highlighted the possible scenarios for the development of relations between Ukraine and Hungary in the future. Currently, Ukraine's relations with western neighbors are characterized by two important factors - asymmetry and hierarchy. The asymmetrical nature of relations is determined primarily by the fact that the role of the western neighboring countries for Ukraine is much more important than the role of Ukraine for them. And as a result, the price paid by Ukraine for deteriorating relations with its neighbors is much higher than the one that potentially will have to pay to neighboring countries for the crisis in its relations with Ukraine. The hierarchy factor is related to the place and role of the "Ukrainian question" in the internal or foreign policy agenda of the western neighbors. For any of the neighboring countries, Ukrainian problems do not have priority, and soon become an additional component of other more important issues. Meanwhile, the region of the Eastern Europe was captured by regional processes associated with the growth of the nationalism influence. The chain reaction of constructing national identities leads to mutual hostility, historical and linguistic controversy, the struggle for the loyalty of national minorities and other similar processes. As a result, the potential for regional cooperation between countries is decreasing, and the contradictions are only rising. Taking into account the possible undesirable consequences of existing trends, the main purpose of conducting expert discussions with ICPS is to seek common, effective mechanisms for the normalization of relations and good-neighborliness between Ukraine and the member-states of the Visegrad Group. First of all, experts recommend the following steps to be taken towards the implementation of the Neighborhood Policy and the improvement of the relations between Ukraine and Hungary: creating a wider regional context and understanding that the above countries are part of one region, cooperation that could expand opportunities for both countries; an open and honest dialogue on the interests of the different positions of the countries on a given issue; refraining from anti-Ukrainian or anti-Hungarian rhetoric in the internal discourses of both countries; search for opportunities for joint projects in the field of energy, regional security, ecology, combating transnational threats. Execution of such top-priority recommendations will help to reduce the number of crises occurring between Ukraine and Hungary, witnessed by which society continues to be in its second year in a row. The International Center for Policy Studies thoroughly deals with the topic of Ukraine's relations with its European neighbors, with relevant developments available at the following links: What is happening in Ukraine's relations with its western neighbors Ukraine and its neighbors: analysis of regional trends The project also plans expert discussions on relations with other countries of the Visegrad Four. Launching a dialogue at an expert level will foster the development of constructive ideas and solutions and minimize possible challenges for regional cooperation. Project materials: Presentation  

ICPS Press
01.10.2018
Foreign Policy

The “Big” Ukrainian-Russian Treaty: Time to Terminate?

Ukraine is about to terminate the epochal Treaty with Russia, singed more than two decades ago, by activating the clause of its Article 40. Sending a notification of non-prolongation six months before the end of another ten-year period would bring the Treaty to an end – and that’s the plan of the Ukrainian President. From our perspective such a move would weaken Ukraine’s international position, including vis-à-vis Russia. The Treaty has been a legal instrument for holding off Russia: despite the fact that Moscow violated the Treaty by annexing Crimea, further escalation was made more risky and expensive because the Treaty has been valid. Moreover, this fundamental document has been referred to in numerous legal processes Ukraine has been running against Russia internationally. Last but not least – the Treaty has been an instrument for Ukraine to induce its weaknesses in a confrontation with a much superior rival. In asymmetric conflicts weak parties need binding norms and agreements, even if they are violated; while stronger parties want to get rid of them. A move by Ukraine to terminate the Treaty may in the end play with Russia’s hand. Introduction There are 41 articles in the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The word “cooperation” is used most often, 35 times. In 1997 it has been definitely a treaty about cooperation virtually in everything. Those days are gone. The Parties to the Treaty are rather fighting than cooperating. Russia has annexed Crimea and supported separatists in Donbas. Hostilities with varying degrees of intensity are under way in economic, trade, energy, information, and a number of other areas. But the Treaty has still been in force. According to Article 40, the Treaty is supposed to continue automatically every ten years, unless one of the Parties notifies the other of its intention to terminate no later than six months beforehand. Deadline for Ukraine is the last day of September. At a recent meeting with ambassadors President Poroshenko demanded the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare documents to notify the Russian party, that Ukraine would opt to halt the Treaty. This would be a simple legal step with possible huge political consequences. For several times the issue of possible termination of the Treaty has been heavily debated in Ukraine. Pros and cons are rather well known by now. But the moment is different today: now a decision has to be taken, be it continuation or termination. There’s no room for further uncertainty. Moreover, presidential elections are just several months ahead. That adds specific flavor to any foreign policy moves, especially when it comes to dealing with Russia. Ukraine doesn’t seem to have a long-term Russian strategy, but politicians do have their election strategies at hand. The stance of the future of the Treaty, which has already become a symbol of hybridism of bilateral relations, may be a powerful asset in election wars of 2019. Political speculations aside, the Treaty is a part of a broader fundamental problem: finding the best way to deal with Russia. This is not an easy problem at all. Strategic asymmetry, high level of interdependence, and lack of trust are key features to keep in mind while shaping the future of bilateral agreements. What’s So Big about the “Big” Treaty? In 1997 the world has been different from what it is today. It is even more so when comes to the Eastern Europe and regional security arrangements. Twenty years ago it seemed like former Soviet republics, although going through a difficult transformation period and occasionally suffering internal conflicts, would however manage to maintain international peace. The agenda of regional security has not been yet dominated by Russia’s intentions to regain dominance over post-Soviet space. Even Russia’s relations with the West have not yet been damaged – that would happen shortly after. Bilaterally Ukraine and Russia were mostly concerned about division of the Black Sea Fleet and the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukrainian Sevastopol. An agreement was needed to resolve most urgent issues and set the framework for further – as it was believed – friendship, cooperation, and partnership. Twenty years ago Russia’s share in Ukraine’s foreign trade was about 38.5%[1], comparing to current 25%[2]. The two countries were united by economic ties, joint ventures, transit capacities, and social interactions. The potential for further cooperation seemed huge, and the Treaty was set to enhance it. The Treaty is mostly about cooperation – from military to educational issues. It covers important problems of citizenship, language, economic cooperation, which were equally important in 1997 and after. But what is more important, it sets a mechanism for settling disputes, establishes regular meetings of minister of foreign affairs, joint commissions and other tools for a constant and active bilateral dialogue. It also outlines strategic partnership between the two countries, aiming at further strengthening it. A part of the Treaty that lays out general principles of bilateral relations (Articles 2-7) carries the spirit of the agreement[3]. This is because of this part that the Treaty is labeled “big”. This is about being good reliable and predictable neighbors, respecting sovereignty and borders of each other and resolving any conflict issues by negotiations and peacefully. To a certain extent the Treaty contained a model for post-Soviet space of how relations with Russia can be arranged. The Treaty has been a framework. It was designed to be a basis to a number of other bilateral documents, among which the Black Sea Fleet Agreement of 1997, the Treaty on the Russian-Ukrainian State Border of 2003, and the so-called Kharkiv Accords of 2010 are the most important. Overall there have been 451 interstate agreements between Ukraine and Russia before 2014. Many of them, of course, were signed before the “Big” Treaty. More than forty of them have already been terminated or suspended as a result of annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. The “Big” Treaty is still valid. Why the Treaty Should or Should Not Be Terminated? The Treaty is valid, although attempts to terminate it have been earlier taken. Back in 2014 the Ukrainian Parliament discussed a law, aimed at denouncing the Treaty, but failed to approve it. A broader approach, targeting at breaking off diplomatic relations with Russia and introduce visa regime for Russian citizens visiting Ukraine, has also been quite popular among Ukrainian politicians and experts. Earlier this year the President called for suspension of specific parts of the Treaty. When it comes to discussing Ukraine’s further steps regarding the Treaty or, generally, regarding Russia, there always appears emotional side hand in hand with political reasoning. Having a valid treaty about cooperation, friendship and partnership – referred to as “strategic” in Article 1 of the Treaty – is certainly a kind of schizophrenia under current geopolitical circumstances. The spirit of the document is completely ruined, and it no longer reflects in any way a true agenda of bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia. On the other hand, the document in many ways reflects actually what Ukraine would like to one day have in relations with Russia: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, refrain from the use or threat of force or peaceful ways of settling disputes. These are fundamentals of mutual trust and good neighborhood. If Ukraine is ever to have another treaty with Russia, it most certainly would contain all these passages. Traditional argument against terminating the Treaty comes to possible weakening of Ukraine’s position in international courts. However, from a juridical standpoint, the fact that the Treaty had been violated does not depend on whether it is terminated or not. Russia can be hold responsible in any case. From this point of view, it is not clear enough what was meant by President Poroshenko, when he mentioned that Ukraine “is prepared and legally protected enough for a next step – termination of the Treaty…which due to Moscow has long ago become an anachronism.”[4] Ukraine has been equally ready for this step during recent four years. However, it has never been an easy option. Terminating the Treaty is often believed to weaken legal constraints on Russia’s further aggressive actions. On the other hand, by annexing Crimea from Ukraine and supporting separatists in Donbas the Kremlin has demonstrated that considerations of hard power calculations are far more important for Russia than any legal commitments. Not only has the “Big” Treaty with Ukraine been violated, but also founding principles of international law. It doesn’t look like if Russia decides further escalation is in its interests, the Treaty would stop it. But the Treaty is also important in one more regard. Ukraine is a weaker party to a protracted asymmetric conflict. Weaker parties are usually better off when a stronger party is bounded by norms, agreements, and multilateral commitments. In other words having no framework agreement with Russia would damage Ukraine more. Possible weakening of international position versus Russia may be a price for internal political gains. Bringing legal basis of bilateral relations into correspondence with political reality is, of course, necessary and inevitable. The “Big” Treaty hasn’t lived up to expectations, and is certainly among other important international norms, violated by Russia. The end of another ten years period of extension may be a right moment to terminate the Treaty. However, extensive analysis should be carried out to define how termination of the Treaty would impact the whole complex of bilateral Ukrainian-Russian agreements. Conclusion Russia’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine has undermined all the values which were laid out the foundation of bilateral relations and thus made the Treaty outdated. However, there have been good reasons for Ukraine so far not to rush and halt the agreement. A violated Treaty has been referred to in international courts and put additional diplomatic and political costs on Russia. With its fundamental provisions being broken, it still provided minimal toolbox for protecting some of remaining Ukrainian interests in relations with Russia. But today – due to the Treaty’s timeline and Ukrainian elections approaching – compromised decisions have little chances to work out. Rhetoric about abandoning some of the Treaty’s provisions, so popular several months ago, is no longer applied. Terminating the Treaty, as well as announced Constitutional amendments about Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership aspirations, are supposed to work together and help bring electoral result next year. Simple decisions, however, are not going to work in a situation so difficult. Ukraine should be getting ready for more unpredicted and more risky relations with Russia after the Treaty is terminated. [1] http://www.ukrexport.gov.ua/ukr/tovaroobig_z_ukr/rus/2631.html [2] http://countries.bridgat.com/Ukraine_Trade_Partners.html [3] Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation // http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_006 [4] President: We Are Ready for Termination of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation // https://www.president.gov.ua/news/prezident-mi-gotovi-do-pripinennya-diyi-dogovoru-pro-druzhbu-49254

ICPS Press
13.09.2018
Foreign Policy

How deep is transatlantic split?

The unity of the West has always been a kind of an axiom for Ukrainian foreign policy. The West is associated with democracy, prosperity, stability and, among other things, unity, based on common values, history and strategic interests. Such a West requires Ukraine as a guide, a field of gravity and a counterbalance to Russian influence. Integration or even cooperation with such a West today - when non-alignment and multipolarity are discredited, and Russia has become a systemic threat - looks like a foreign policy paradigm without serious competitors. It is within its framework that the talks and declarations of accession to NATO and the EU, which largely replaced the complex foreign policy planning, fall into place. Under such conditions, the least that Ukrainians would like is a violation of the unity of the West. It generates a number of unpleasant questions, from the capabilities of NATO to maintenance of an anti-Russian sanctions regime. In the long run, the probability of facing one of the largest difficulties which is the choice between those who we consider allies is increasing. If the strategic interests of the United States and the European Union are dispersed, then, of course, not only Ukraine will feel the consequences. A strategic alliance between the two poles of the modern world remains a guarantee of global stability and security, or at least that they have been left behind. In this context, events of recent months gain added value. The sharp difference between the positions of the United States and major European powers over the agreement on Iran's nuclear program, the US's decision to relocate the Embassy to Jerusalem, and the real prospects of a US-EU trade war make us recall the last-year events and declarations. Donald Trump gave a lecture to NATO's European allies on how they should consider security; and Angela Merkel responded by saying that the times when Europe and the United States could rely on each other went by. This march, Donald Trump announced the imposition of a duty on imports of steel and aluminum, postponing the entry into force of this EU decision by June 1. Such a step could be the beginning of a conflict between the two largest economies in the world, trade between which reached a mark of 1.1 trillion dollars. Interdependence among them is even better illustrated by the impressive volumes of total sales of American companies affiliated to Europe and European companies affiliated to those of the US, reaching 5.5 trillion dollars. If the decision on the imposition of American duties will come into force, and Europeans will respond symmetrically - we are talking about the imposition of mirror-image duties on American goods, so far on clothes, orange juice, motorcycles, but the list can be expanded - the effect will be even stronger than the one, which was accompanied by the collapse of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership project (TTIP). Of course, this effect will be negative for a strategic partnership between the United States and Europe. But will it affect political cooperation? To this end, it is worth adding exceptionally deep differences in the views on the issue of international security. Europeans have responded critically to the transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem - a step that, in the opinion of many, violates the balance and prospects of the Middle East conflict settlement. The situation with a nuclear deal with Iran deeply criticized by Trump, which has not, however, stroke a chord among European partners, is even more potentially dangerous. As a result, the United States came out of a multilateral agreement, providing Iran with an opportunity to set uneasy conditions for Europeans if they want to keep it in place. In some way what has happened can be seen as a shifting the problem from the US to the EU. This is rather risky not only concerning the Middle East, but also in the non-proliferation regime. Differences in the views and attitudes of Europeans and Americans seem to become commonplace. To what extent can they cross the line? For Ukraine, this issue is of practical importance in view of at least two factors - the effectiveness of NATO and support for the anti-Russian sanctions regime. They are the basis of a non-alternative foreign policy strategy of recent years. The good news is that NATO will remain as effective as it has been, even in the wake of the deteriorating global climate of transatlantic relations. Saving a uniting front of anti-Russian sanctions will be harder. But - and here the news is not so good - a simple strategy "trying to be friends with the West against Russia" will work worse. Despite the deepening of the contradictions in certain spheres, the transatlantic alliance holds together strategic interests. The balance of power in the world is changing rapidly: in the 15-20 years, China and India will play a leading role, and the EU will try to keep its place in the club of great powers. Historical and normative unity makes the United States and Europe almost natural allies, and a long period of peaceful and constructive cooperation gives reason to trust each other. NATO, as an embodiment of this trust, is also beneficial to all, as it creates a sufficient deterrent potential. For Europe, NATO is the best way to strengthen its own security. The US, no matter how much talk about the burden of spending on the common good, also gets from NATO more than it spends on it. Pragmatic interests will ensure the continued functioning of both NATO and other key institutions of the West. Truth be told, this does not mean that Ukraine will easily join them. The future of the anti-Russian sanctions regime looks vaguer. Intensifying disputes between Europe and the United States will lead to a revision of priorities and a temptation to turn positions on sanctions into a subject for trading on other issues. Europe is likely to suffer more from the imposition of trade duties, and the US position on sanctions looks more coherent and consistent. Against the backdrop of worsening relations and economic losses in Europe, demand for rhetoric about weakening or abolishing sanctions imposed on Russia may well increase. The danger of a tariff war between the United States and the EU for Ukraine is precisely the fact that, struggling for the economic interests of Europeans, it will strengthen the positions of those who want to compensate loss by deeper cooperation with Russia. The civilization split in the West or the destruction of its key institutions will not happen: even the Kremlin is unlikely to dream about that. However, concerning temporary exacerbation of contradictions and contradictory positions on important issues for Ukraine it is quite possible. In these circumstances, we will probably need a more subtle approach to the western vector of our foreign policy.

ICPS Press
25.05.2018
Foreign Policy

Nuclear disarmament: Ukrainian-Korean lessons

Ukraine and North Korea which are so different and distant were connected within the context of nuclear non-proliferation. There was a time when Ukraine made a significant contribution to strengthening this regime by nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, North Korea consistently undermines this regime by demonstrating to the whole world by its own example, the opportunities and risks of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In recent weeks, given the rhetoric of nuclear disarmament on the Korean peninsula following the summit of the leaders of the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, the parallels have become too obsessive; and the question of whose choice will eventually turn out to be the right one is a matter of interest to many. According to the conditions of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 which has been so often mentioned in the last years, Ukraine has acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state, thus getting rid of the nuclear arsenal that remained on its territory after the collapse of the USSR. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan were not the pioneers on this complicated and controversial path: several years ago, the South African republic rejected the nuclear weapons. Unlike the post-Soviet republics, South Africa fully controlled its small nuclear arsenal - for this reason it could be considered a model for future nuclear disarmament cases. Current nuclear states are primarily interested in increasing the number of such cases, but the paradox is that they are often seen as a source of threats pushing other states to obtain nuclear weapons. In case of Ukraine this paradox transformed four years ago from an intellectual puzzle to a key issue of foreign policy. The strategic challenges faced by the leadership of the DPRK today differ significantly from those that the leaders of the Ukrainian state tried to resolve a quarter of a century ago. The international environment and the international security situation are fundamentally different. Thus, such cases are more interesting to compare. Could Ukraine get the best, in words of Donald Trump, deal? And will North Korea follow the example South Africa? What are the starting points for a serious talk about nuclear disarmament in the modern world as a whole? In the early 1990's, optimism and faith in the future without conflicts prevailed worldwide. Against this backdrop, nuclear weapons seemed not to be the relic of the past, with which it is impossible to solve the challenges of the future: to accelerate economic development, to change the social model, or to build an effective democracy. Membership in NATO seemed rather reachable, moving towards Europe simple, and the neighborhood with Russia good. Rejecting nuclear weapons was much easier twenty five years ago: the deal seemed to be to exchange of unnecessary military resources for such necessary legitimacy, Western support and money. North Korea makes its decisions in other circumstances. The period of romantic perception of international security has past long ago, and events in Ukraine have considerably deepened the crisis of world order. The demand for hard power has suddenly emerged again, and nuclear weapon is considered by many as a "great counterpart" in the military capabilities of the various potential states. It seems that Ukrainian experience has been useful for many, including the DPRK. Its key lesson is that exchanging nuclear weapons is reasonable only if reliable security assurances are provided. A number of states which were technologically capable of creating nuclear weapons, from Australia to Japan, and from Sweden to South Korea used to go that way. The fact is that for the United States, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a priority of the foreign policy strategy since the 1940s. Sanctions and preventive military strikes appeared to be less effective instruments than the proliferation of security assurances: and over the past 70 years, US security commitments have been expanded exponentially, in both multilateral formats, such as NATO or ANZUS, and in bilateral agreements concluded with Japan or South Korea. Nearly always the motive behind such commitments is the desire of the United States to prevent their allies from gaining nuclear capability. Ukraine in its time did not learn this lesson. Nuclear weapons should not be exchanged for money or for any other non-security related resources. Indeed, Ukraine did not control nuclear weapons on its own territory and it weakened its position in negotiations with Washington. However, it didn’t mean that Ukraine could not demand more. In 1994, this could be a security treaty with the United States, which including an obligation to protect Ukraine, which is not provided in the Budapest memorandum. Today, in a crisis of international security and lack of trust, such an agreement is not enough.

ICPS Press
04.05.2018
Foreign Policy

Expert discussion: “Anti-Russian sanctions: the instrument of influence or demonstration of weakness”

On April 25, the International Center for Policy Studies held an expert discussion on "Anti-Russian sanctions: an instrument of influence or demonstration of weakness?" The regime of sanctions has been implemented for four years, and the preservation or expansion of its scope has become a peculiar criterion for the success of foreign policy in general. How valid is this criterion? What can be achieved through sanctions and what is the best way of their application? «Sanctions can help prevent further violations and the use of violence – here there are more chances of success. And this is exactly what worked in the sanctions of the West against Russia. From my point of view, the main role played by Western sanctions is precisely the suspension of further Russian aggression, "said ICPS expert Mykola Kapitonenko. "Sanctions are an instrument, part of a strategy aimed at achieving priority goals. "And sanctions are the instrument that has its own price and fairly limited effectiveness which leads to creating complex dilemmas over time because it has rather  controversial consequences," he said. As a rule, sanctions are imposed to influence a country that violates agreed norms, international principles with a view to changing its behavior. They are relatively frequent: among 26 sanction programs currently conducted by the United States 12 were initiated over the past 10 years; the United Nations has imposed sanctions more than 20 times since the end of the Cold War, however before only twice. Today in the vast majority of cases there are imposed the so-called "targeted" sanctions as opposed to comprehensive sanctions, which were much more popular until the 20th century. The key difference between them is to differentiate between those responsible for implementing a particular policy of groups or individuals from the rest of the population, the expert said. According to ICPS research, statistics of recent decades indicate that only in one of every fourth case, economic sanctions have led to significant changes in the behavior of the state against which it was imposed. The highest effectiveness of sanctions - about 50% - is observed in the case of destabilization of the political regime. But in such a case there are significant reservations: external factors can become a factor in consolidating society around the ruling power. Meanwhile, according to Kapitonenko, the sanction policy of the West is now not aimed at changing the regime in Russia. Speaking about the recommendations on the application of sanctions against Ukraine by Russia, the expert emphasized the importance of maintaining meaningful dialogue with the partner states: the more profound is the understanding of the interests and controversial assessments / positions of the partners regarding anti-Russian sanctions, the more productive and prolonged cooperation will be in this direction. It is important to create a hierarchy of goals that need to be realistic, taking into account the potential and the limit of the effectiveness of sanction policy. Alongside this, restrictive measures against the Russian Federation should be expanded, as long as the emphasis be made on target sanctions, in particular personal, he said. In addition, asymmetry in relations between Ukraine and Russia should be taken into account, because, according to the expert, in this case Ukraine is a weak and vulnerable party that essentially distinguishes Ukrainian anti-Russian sanctions from the West. Also, economic sanctions should have a transparent procedure and control over their implementation in order not to become an instrument of internal political struggle with competitors, "Kapitonenko noted. The International Center for Policy Studies has prepared recommendations on the strategy for applying sanctions: Supporting a more meaningful dialogue with partner countries. The more profound the understanding of their interests and contradictory assessments / positions regarding anti-Russian sanctions is, the more productive and lasting will be cooperation in this direction; Create a hierarchy of goals. The sanction strategy - like any other - cannot be effective without identifying the primary goals. They need to be realistic, taking into account the potential and limit of the effectiveness of sanction policies; Determination of optimal characteristics of the sanction regime; An important and effective instrument is the combination of sanctions with threats of subsequent sanctions, as well as with other instruments of pressure; A more in-depth study of a multilateral format of anti-Russian sanctions is needed. On the one hand, the common stance of as many countries as possible concerning the issue of anti-Russian sanctions makes their use not so expensive or risky for each of them individually; Asymmetry in relations between Ukraine and Russia must be taken into account; Sanctions should be state policy instrument followed by clear and understandable application of logic and transparent rules. Transforming them into a means of combating competitors will discredit not only Ukrainian sanctions against Russia, but also undermine the effectiveness and credibility of sanctions in general; The use of sanctions – the complex and sometimes contradictory instrument with due regard to the asymmetry of Ukrainian-Russian relations is rather expensive. Therefore, it should be an element of two strategies: the settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the determination of the format of bilateral relations with Russia.

ICPS Press
25.04.2018